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Pdazmlo v. Rhode Island: Clarification and More Confusion on the Notice Issue

I

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court recently decided a takings case that many hoped would
provide much needed guidance regarding takings claims brought by those who acquire property
with notice of existing or impending restrictions.' Until the recent case of Palazzolo v. Rhode

Island.the Supreme Court had hardly addressed the so-called "notice issue" that has frequently
arisen in state and lower federal courts. In the absence of deiinitive diiection fiom the Supreme
Court, lower courts treated preexisting limitations in different ways, many finding notice to
defeat an otherwise potentially successfirl claim for just compensation.
Much of the confusion exhibited by state and lower federal court cases decided before
Palaaolo stems firom the lack of a consistent application of two distinct tests established by the
Supreme Court or i?om misapplication of one of the two tests. Under a rule articulated in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council,2 a regulation that denies "all economicallybeneficial or
productive use of land" is regarded as having essentially the same effect as a physical
appropriation,' and consequently requires compensation irespective of the public interest served
by the reg~lation.~
In such circumstances, a taking will be defeated only if the limitation was
not "newly legislated or decreed" but was instead grounded in "background principles of the
State's law of property and nuisance."' When an owner cannot allege fbll deprivation of
economically beneficial use, a regulatory taking may nonetheless be established under a second

'

Palatzolov. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

'The Supreme Court has held that any permanent physical wcqation estsblishes a taking, regardlessof the
imponant public interast that may be served by the occupation. a Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
(?

Gorp., 458 U.S. 419,426 (1982).
Luols 505 u.S. at 1015-1017.
Id. at 1029.

'

test promulgated by the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transmrtation Co. v. Citv of New

~ o r kUnder
. ~ this ad hoc test, the reviewing court should consider "the economic impact of the
regulation.. .the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations.. .[and] the character of the governmental action."'
Despite the apparent dichotomy created by the Supreme Court, prior to Palazzololo, the

b a n d Penn Central tests were frequently commingled in the decisions of state and lower
federal courts addressing post-regulation acquisition, often allowing for the application of a
"notice defense." The defense also emerged in cases applying only one of the two tests. The
investment-backed expectations prong of the Penn Central test was given heightened or
predominate si@cance.

Courts found owners Bcquiring p r o p t y following enactment of

regulations to have "notice," defeating investment-backed expectations and the takings claim
itself. At times, knowledge of the likelihood of future @ation

at the time of aquisition was

found to create such notice. Moreover, some state and lower federal wurts held that regulations

in existence at the time of purchase or acquisition are "background principles" barring takings
claims alleging deprivation of all economically beneficial use, notwithstanding the language in

Lucasindicating that a background principle cannot be "newly legislated or decreed."*

In

addition to misapplying the Lucas and Penn Central tests, state and lower federal courts also
tended to ignore a Supreme Court decision in which the Court apparently rejected the notice
defense.9
Palmmlo is a fairly typical example of the types of cases creating this confusion.
Palazzolo acquired the p r o m at issue through dissolution of a corporation after the limiting

438 U.S. 104,124 (1978).

' Id. at 124.

Idat 1029.
See Nollan v. California Cosstal Commission, 484 U.S. 825,833 a 2 (1987)
-

regulations were already in place.10 After applications to the property-which can be
0,
described as "salt manh subject to tidal flding"ll-were denied, Palazzolo filed an inverse
condemnation action in Rhode Island state court.12 He alleged that the wetlands regulations had
deprived him of all economically beneficial use of the property without compensation, in
violation of the F i and Fourteenth ~mendments.'~
The Rhode Island Supreme Court
eventually heard the case" and held that it was not ripe for judicial review.15 In the alternative,
the court found that the preexistence of the wetlands regulation defeated Palazzolo's claim,
regardless of whether the categorical or partial takings formulation was used.16
In the United States Supreme Court, Palanolo's -based

claim did not hold up based

on the undisputed evidence that he would be permitted to build at least one house on the upland
portion of his land, yielding a development value of about $zOO,OOO."

However, in dicta, the

Court noted that "if a restrictive regulation is in place at the time of transfer, the initial owner
nonetheless transfers 11I rights since, "a regulation that otherwise would be unconstitutional
absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the State's law by mere
virtue of the passage of title."" The Court subsequently decided that Palazzolo might have a
claim under the factors outlined in Penn Central and remanded for application of that test.
Instrumental to this decision was the court's holding that a partial takings claim, "is not barred

10~~Palattolov.RhodeIslaa4533U.S.606,614(2001). Themgulati~ll~wm,however,enactedenactederthe
corporation formed by Palszzolo and othem purchased the property. &&&
Id at 613.
Id at 615.
13 Id_ Palazzolo sought $3,150,000 in damages based on the estimated value of a proposed 74-lot residential

I'

l2

&&ision
at 616.
I' See Palamlo v. State, 746 k 2 d 707 (RL 2000).
"ldat714.
'6Mat715-7~7.
l 7 ~&zmlo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.606,630-632 (2001).
Id. at 629430.

by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the stateimposed re~mction."'~

In rejecting notice as a categorical bar to a takings claim under either the categorical or partial
formulation, the Court appeaued more concerned with giving the state too much power to de6ne

than with
property rights and potentiany depriving the Takings Clause of~ignifjcance,~

articulating clear rules regarding the effect of notice m futuretakings cases.
Although P a k m l p can hardly be d e s c n i as clarifying the notice issue, it did provide a

few de6nitive answers. Transfer of title following enactment of a law or regulation that would
require payment ofjust compensation in order to be constitutional will not necessarily bar a
takings claim. However, notice and transfer of title are apparently relevant in the Penn Central

analysis, and are potentially important in the

context. Those who acqwe property subject

to exiting limitations or regulation will have a chance to get just compensation. How good that
chance will be, however, is an open question. Thus, the Court's decision, though providing some
degree of guidance, will likely perpetuate existing cohsion and inconsistency in state and lower
federal courts.
Background: Supreme Court Precedent

The Supreme Court iirst recognized regulatory takings in Pcmqlvania Coal Co, v,

aho on"

In that case, Justice Holmes voiced the oft-cited proposition that while "government

hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every.. .change in the general law," a regulation may go "too far" and constitute a
taking." Unfortunately, the opinion did not offer much more than a quotable statement. When a

l9

Ip at 630.
&&& at 626428.
260 U.S.393 (1922).
Id.at 415.
-

regulation goes Woo far" was not clearly

Moreover, a clear rule regarding the

regulatory takings analysis did not surface due to virtual silence on the part of the Supreme Court

in the years following Pennsvlvania Coal, leaving regulatory takings jurisprudence in the hands

of state and lower federal courts. Perhaps the only consistency in the early regulatory takings
decisions of the lower courts was the tendency not to 6nd a taking."

Over fifty years after Pennsylvania Coal. the Supreme Court decided the case of Perm
Transmrtation Co. v. Civ of New ~ork."In Penn Central. the Court admitted that it had

been, "unable to develop any set fonnula for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than

remain disproportionatelyconcentrated on a few persons."26It described the required analysis as
involving "ad hoc factual inquiries,"27 but nonetheless outlined "several factors that have
particular significancen: (1) "the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant"; (2) "the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and
(3) "the character of the governmental action."28
In Kaieser Aetna v. United statesm a small change in wording set the stage for an

objective inquiry into investment-backed expectations. When citing the Penn Central test the
Court did not refer to "distinct" investment-backed expectations, but to "reasonable" investmentbacked e x p e c ~ i o n s .Whether
~~
intended to change the standard or not, the objective inquiry has

"Tbe court described ihe issue as a "que.sIionof degree" that could wt "bedisposed of by generalpmpnsitions." !&
''&David L.Wes,28 STETSONL.REV.523,525 (1999)(stating that in the period of Supreme Court Jikwc.
nt
--416

mte and lower fed& courts eroded regulatory takings to the point that they were, 'tirtuallymoribund").
438 U.S.104 (1978).
"Id
.
.-at 124.
Id
2'

" Z a t 124.

"444 U.S.164 (1979).
"See Id at 175.

Q

frequently been utilized by state and lower federal courts:'

often employed to create rules

regarding the effect of "notice" on takings claims?2

In Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto ~

0 the, Court
~ first
~ addressed notice issues and

appeared to

adopt the notice defense. The plaintifcompany in that case was an inventor, developer and
producer of pesticides. It challenged data consideration and disclosure provisions of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)~
as violating the Takings

lau use?' The

Act originally was mainly a licensing and labeling statute that required submission of certain

types of datas In 1972, the Act was amended to allow the submitter of data to protect portions

of the data by designating them as trade secrets."

A 1978 amendment to FZFRA eliminated this

provision and allowed for disclosure of health, safety and environmental data to "qualified
requesters" even if that data contained trade

In addressing the takings claim, the Court divided its analysis of investment-backed
expectations based on the evolution of FIFRA. The Court first considered data submitted to the
EPA following the effective date of the 1978 Amendments to FIFRA. It concluded that

Monsanto could not have had a reasonable investment-backed expectation that the information
" &&& Furey v. City of Sacramento, 592 F.Supp 463,469 (E.D.
Cal. 1984) ("(1711order for an expmtion to be
entitled to the law's protection, it must be more than simply 'investment-backed'; it must be w n a b l e " ) ; Price v.
City of Junction,Texas,711 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1983) ('ply their very nature such inoperablejunk vehicles do no
embody reasonable, investmenthcked expectations").
32
East Cape May Associates v. New Jersey, 693 k 2 d 114, 120 (N.J. App. 1997) ("[w]hether or not
expectations are considered reasonable will depend to a signilicant extent on whether the p r o m owner had wtice
in advance of its iwatment decision that the g o v e ~ t aregulations
l
which are alleged to constitute the taking
had been or would be enacted"); Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1230 (9th Cu. 1998) (indicating that
the plaintiffs could not have had a msonable expectation of being able to develop their propwty without having to
comply with state law in effect at the time); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. C1.37,51 (Fed.CI. 1994) (evaluating
whether the plaintiffs expectations were objectively reasonable by considering whether the plaintiff "or someone
similarly situated" would have had notice of the jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers); Furey v. City of
Sacmnento, 592 F.Supp 463,469 (E.D. Cal. I N ) (expe3ations must be reasonable, meaning "at least consistent
with the law in force at the time of the formation of the expeaation).
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
7 U.S.C. 8136
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 998.
%id. at 991.
" Id.at 992.
-at 995-996.
Id

''
"

P.

would be kept confldential except as required by the statute.39 The company could "hardly argue

that its reasonable investment-backed expectations are disturbed when the EPA acts to use or
disclose the data in a manner that was authorized by law at the time of the submission."" The
Court similarly relied on the statutory scheme when addressing data submitted between the years

of 1972 and 1978. During that time period, the Act gave companies an opportunity to protect
trade secrets from disclosure and therefore allowed for reasonable investment-backed
expectations that could support a takings claim?'

The Court took a more interesting approach when it considered data submitted prior to
1972, when FIFRA was silent on use and disclosure of data submitted. It held that, "absent an

express promise, Monsanto had no reasonable investment-backed expectation that its
information would remain inviolate in the hands of the EPA.""

According to the court, "[iln an

industry that long has been the focus of great public concern and si&cant

government

regulation, the possib'ity was substantial that the Federal Government, which had thus far taken
no position on disclosure of health, safety, and environmental data concerning pesticides, upon
focusing on the issue, would find disclosure to be in the public interest."" Due to the highly
regulated nature of the environment, and to the existence of some evidence regarding a practice
of use of data submitted prior to 1972, Monsanto could have no reasonable investment-backed
expectations."
Even a c o w a t i v e read of Monsanto leads to the conclusion that one cannot have
reasonable investment-backed expectations which do not equate with laws currently in force, and

39

42

Id at 1006.

Id.at 1006-1007.
&kleshausv. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.986,1010-1011(1984).
Id. at 1008.

1

therefore supports the existence of a notice defense. The portion of the opinion addressing
information submitted prior to 1972 apparently endorses the idea that constructive notice is
capable of defeating investment-backed expectations.
The Court later limited the applicability of Monsanto in a footnote in Nollan v. California
Coastal

omm mission.^'

In

the plaintiffs leased beachbnt property with an option to

purchase conditioned on their promise to replace a bungalow on the property. In order to do so,
the plaintiffs had to obtain a permit 6om the California Coastal

om mission.^^

The Nollans

acquired the property after the Commission had begun to implement a policy of conditioning
permits for rebuilding houses on the transfer of

easement^.^"

The Commission applied this

policy to the Nollans and accordiiy conditioned the grant of the permit on the surrender of an
easement to be used as a public pathway. The Nollans then challenged the condition under the
Takings clause." In a footnote, the Supreme Court declared that the Nollans' rights were not
affected by acquisition following implementation of the Commission's policy- "[slo long as the
Commission could not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without compensating
them, the prior owners must be understood to have transferred their full property rights in

conveying the lot.&' In so concludii the Court rejected Justice Brennan's attempt to use
Monsanto, distinguishing that case based on the fact that it dealt with "valuable Government
Consequently, the case currently has limited, if any, applicabiity in the reat property
context.

45

484 U.S. 825 (1987).

"Id
- at 828.

Although the notice issue was addressed only briefly, t h e w Court ultimately held
that the condition would violate the Takings Clause in the absence of compemation." The broad
language in the footnote and the holding of the case demonstrate that the Court apparently
rejected the idea that the preexistence of limiting regulations, and perhaps even actual notice of
existing regulations would necessarily bar a takings claim.

In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal COU&'~ the Supreme Court created a nevi test (and
therefore a dichotomy in takings analysis) that soon became relevant in cases raising the notice
issue. The plaintiff paid $975,000 for two residential lots, intendiig to build two singlafamily
homes. Two years later, the South Carolina legislature enacted the Beach6ont Management
A*"

which prevented the plaintifffiom building any permanent habitable structures on the

land.% Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court again noted that it had, "generally eschewed

any set formulan for determining when a regulation results in a taking, but then stated that it had,
"described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable without casespecific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint." The first category
identified was physical takings, in which compensation is required "no matter how minute the
intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it."% The second category
described involves regulations denying "all economically beneficial or productive use of the
land."" According to the Court,,"total deprivation of beneficial use is, fiom the landowner's
point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation."58

" Nollan v.

California Coastal Commissio& 484 U.S. 825,841-842 (1987).
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
S.C. CODE ANN 948-39-250
(Supp. 1990).
LUC~S.
50 U.S. at 1007.
ldallolsl

"
''

"Id.

i-

V. SOU^^ c a r o b Coastal COWS, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
ss I d at 1017.

-

n
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Although the Court suggested that the second category had always been recognized, its
choice to single out regulations that deny all economically beneficial use does not directly follow
&om the cases citeds9 The case is thus best characterized as creating a new category of "per se"
takings that will not require application of the Penn Central test. The Court ultimately left no

doubt regarding its new formulation in stating that, "when the owner of real property has been
called upon to saa%ce &economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is,
to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.& However, the Court
subsequently qdifled the statement in declaring that, "where the State seeks to sustain
regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist
compensation only ifthe logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the interests were not
part of his title to begin with.'"'

It accordingly decided that a

depriving a landowner

of all economically beneficial use, "cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation) but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of
the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.**
State and Lower Federal Courts on Penn Centml, Lueas. Nollan and Notice
Although the Court in

left the Penn Central test unaltered, state and lower federal

courts have not consistently interpreted Penn Central and Lucas as providing distinct tests.
59 Fm example, the Cwt quozed fmm Aghs v. Citv O f T t ~ n447
, U.S. 255,260 (1980)-the F i Amendment is
violated when a regulation "does not subslantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner
eq,wmicallv viable use of his laad" Lncas, 505 U.S. at 1016 (ernpkmis added inLucas). This statement appears
to indicate only that deprivation of economicallyviable use is required if a regulation advances legitimate state
interests. It does not seem to support the proposition tlnt a regulation that denies all economically beneficial use isa
pz$g taking. Both dissenting opinions argued that the Court has never r e o o a ~special fonn of taking when
regulations deprive all economically beneficial use.
Id. at 1047 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("when the
government regulation prevents the owner from any economidly valuable use, the private interest is
unquestionably substantial, but we have never before held that no public interest can outweigh it"); a.at 1062-1063
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[allthough in dicta we lave sometimes recited that a law 'effects a taking ifit denies an
owner economically viable use of his land,' our rulings have rejected such an absolute position") (quoting
Citv of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980)).
M
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
Id. at 1027.
- at 1029.
Id.

a
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Various components of the two tests have been combined or disregarded in cases involving
notice problems. Both the d o n s prong of Penn Central and the background principles
exception of

have been applied so as to make notice (sometimes even constructive notice)

of regulations a highly relevaut, or entirely determid+ factor in the takings analysis.
Heightened emphasis has been placed on the investment-backed expectations inquiry of

&I&& and the background principles exception has been extended beyond its intended scope.
Furthermore, the expectations analysis has been applied in the categorical takingsanalysis,
despite the Supreme Court's Mureto identify reasonable investment-backed expectations as a
relevant factor in categorical takings cases. Moreover, decisions applying notice as a bar have
generally ignored the only defkitive Supreme Court discussion on the matter-the Nollan
f~otnote.~
One of the most si@cant

Penn Central and

confirsions lies in the tendency of some courts to codate the

analyses.64 This has fiesuently ocamed through importation of the

investment-backed expectations prong into -based

claims.65 For example, in Good v,

%e.g. East Caw Mav Associates v. State of New Jersey, 693 k 2 d 114,
120 (N.J. App. Div. 1997) (stating that the plaintiffwas "entitled to asmt whatever de-velapmental rights its
d d have had, but also indicating that the reasonablenessof expectations will depend on whether the
plaintiff had notice of existing or impendmg reguIations). A few courts have wen cited &&g as potentially
undermining the -ems
of a notice defense.
Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. CI. 37.50-51 &a
15 (Fed C1. 1994) (noting that the United States Claims Court had "applied the 'notice' defense as an independent
basis to deny a wetlands takings claim," but citing the &&g footnote, and describing its impact as limiting the
defense to situations involving "a 'voluntary exchange' between the gwemment and private entities"); Store Safe
Redlands Associates v. United States, 35 Fed CI. 726,735 (Fed. C1. 19%) (citing
in support of the
proposition that an "argument that plaintiff cannot predicate a taking on regulatory actions predating its purchase of
the property is not a logical conclusion based on precedent").
SeeCreppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (describing the character of goveinmental action
prong of Penn Central as ewamining the restriction "under the lens of state nuisance law"); Loveladies Harbor,Inc.
v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("therehas been a regulatory taking if (1) there was a denial of
emnomically viable use of the property as a result of the regutatory imposition; (2) the pmperty owner had distind
iwestmcnthcked eqeaations; and (3) it was an i n M vested in the owner, as a matter of state property law, and
not ullhn the power of the state to regdate under common law nuisance doctrine"); Kelly v. Taho Regional
Planning Agency, 855 P.2d 1027, 1034 (Nev. 1993) (employing the three Penn Central factors as means to decide
whether there was a deprivation of all economicaIIy beneficial use).
65 &gg& Department of Environmental Protection v. Burgess, 772 So.2d 540,542 (FIa 1 Dist. C t App. 2000)
("[tlo establish his claim of a wmpeosable regulatory 'total' takin~of his properly, appeUce also was required to
"Not all couns have ignored the case.

?

A

United

the Federal Circuit declared that, ?he Supreme Court in-L

did not mean to

eliminate the requkement that reasonable, investment-backed expectations establish a taking.'47
The

takings recognized in

were instead categorical only in the sense that they are

"compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in suumrt of the
r e ~ t r a i n t .According
~
to the cowt, the Supreme Court intended to continue to require a

showing of interference with reasonable investment backedexpectations, but simply did not
discuss expectations in

because the requirement was clearly satisfied in that case.69 It

consequently held that "[rleasonable investment-backed expectations are an element of every
regulatory takings case.'"'
Other courts have not simply applied expectations as an additional hctor in the Lucas
analysis, but have gone a step M h e r in equating investment-backed expectations with the
background principles referred to in

m. This was the approach taken by the Eighth Circuit

in fitdoor Graohics. Inc, v. Citv of ~urlinaton.~~
In that case, the court cited L s u for the
proposition that "even where the state enacts a regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use, it has no duty to compensate if the p r o s c n i use interests were not part of the
owner's title to begin withnn It then described the evaluation of whether the landowner's
''bundle of rights previously included the right to engage in the restricted activity" as involving

demonstrate that the permit denial interfered with his reasonable, distinct inveamem-backed expectations, held at
the time he purchased tbe properly); McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Conncil, 530 SE.2d 628,633 (S.C. 2000)
(investment backed expectations were not discussed in Lucas because "therewas no question David Lucas had
distinct imesmmthckedexpectations")
189 F.3d 1355 (Fed Cir. 1999).
"Id at 1361.
"Id. (emphasis in original).

"Id.

70

an inquiry into "the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the landowner at the time of..
his acquisition

'
7

0s or capital expenditure on, the property in question.""

Still other courts have tended to make notice dispositive in either the Penn Central
analysis using reasonable imemmt-backed expectations, or in the

s-

using

background principles of state property or nuisance law. For instance, in Gazza v. New York
Deoartment of Environmental ~omervation,~~
the New York Court of Appeals found notice of
existing limitations to determine the outcome. In that case, the plaintiff brought a takings claim
based on the denial of his application to fill tidal wetlands. The legislation requiring approval
prior to filling was in place at the time the plaintiff acquired the property." The court, citing

LYcas.concluded that "the purchase of a 'bundle of rights' necessarily includes the acquisition of
a bundle of limitations.n76 Although a prior owner may have been able to bring a successfid
action for compensation, "once taken, those property interests are no longer owned by the private
owner and may not be sold by such party."n
A similar analysis has been applied when a new owner should have been aware that
restrictions would be placed on the land in the future. For example, in Good v. United States. 78
the court characterized the investment-backed expectations requirement-which
applicable in both partial and total takings ases-as

it found

limiting recovery of compensation to those

"who can demonstrate that they bought their property in reliance on the non-existence of the
challenged

Relying on the frequently mentioned "windfall argument,"80 the court

1u.

"189 F.3d 1355 (Fed Ci. 1999).
"Id. at 1360, auotine C1v. United States, 41 F.3d 627,632 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
s " ~ o u Wapplying notice as a bar often provide similarjustification. SeeC a . 1 v. United States,41 F.3d 627
(Fed. Ci.1994) C[o]ne who buys properly with knowledge of the restraint assumes the risk ofeconomic losS,OSs,

?

fl

posited that "it is common sense that one who buys with lmowledge of a restraint assumes the
risk of economic loss."*' In such circumstances a windfall would occur if compensation were
provided because "the owner presumably paid a discounted price for the property."82 The court
subsequently applied this notice prohibition to the claimant who could not develop due to a
restriction in the Endangered Species Act, even though the ESA was not in existence at the time
he purchased the property. Pointing to the "regulatory c l i i t e " present at the time the claimant
acquired title, "rising environmental awareness" and "ever-tightening land use regulations," the
court held that the owner could not have had a reasonable expectation of being able to develop
his property as desired several years after acquiring title? It then concluded that, "the
government is entitled to summary judgment on a regulatory takings claim where the plaintiff
lacked reasonable, investment-backed expectations, even where the challenged government
action substantially reduced the value of the plaintiffs property.""

making compensation a windfall since the owner "presumably paid a discounted price."); Atlas Enternrises Ltd v.
Ynited States, 32 Fed. C1.704 (1995) ("Genaally when an owner buys properly with notice of the restrictions upon
development ofthat property, he assumes the risk of economic lass, since the ''market has already discounted for the
restmint."); AneUo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870,871 (N.Y.1997) ("[alny compensation received
by a m b q u m t o m for enforae~nentof the very restriction that s
d to abate the purchase price would amount
to a windfall").
Id. at 1361.

'
"Id.
831d.at 1361-1362. In other w o r k "co&veee

notice that regulations may be enacted in the future will aftice.

Sue?; a lule may derive 6on1Monsanto and potentially makes the notice defense applicable even when the

regulations at issue were enacted after acquisition of the property. Good is not the only case employing mice as a
bar when regulations were not yet in effect at the time of purchase based on the "regulatory climate."
District Intown Proc-des L i e d Fmtnershi~v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874,884 @.C. App. 1999)
("Plusinessesthat operate in an industry with a history of regulation have no m n a b l e expectation that regulation
will not be strengthened to achieve legislative ends"); Mock v. Demnment of Environmental Resowces, 623 A2d
940 (Pa. 1993) ("the Modrs could not reasonably expect to develop their land free from government regulation
because it is riprarian land, which has been subject to regulation for centuries"). But MariMariUans Inc. v. United
43 Fed. C1.86,88 (Fed. C1. 1992) ("[pllaintiffs voluntarily operate in a regulated industry but that is not
dispositive of all ad hoc takings analysis").
Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355,1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (giantkg the summaryjudgment and stating that the
plaintiffs "lack of reasonable investment-backed expectations defeats his lakings claim as a matter of law).

a

,p

'.'

In Avenal v. United states8' the court similarly found knowledge of the possibility of
future restrictions to determine a regulatory takings claim. In that case, the plaintiffs leased state
water-bottom lands for the purpose of oyster propagation. They alleged that a freshwater
diversion project created poor conditions for oyster growth, resulting in a taking.86 The court
traced the development of the diversion project, referring to evidence of intent to implement the
diversion project as far back as 1900." Based on this history, the court declared that the
plaintiffs could not "insist on a guarantee. of non-interference by government when they well

knew or should have known that, ia nsponse to widely-shared public concerns, including
concerns of the oystering industry i

w government actions were being

Since the

plan had been proposed many years before and was "actively being pursued by state and federal
agencies" beginning in the 1950sand 1960%the plaid& who acquired their leases in the
1970~
could
~ not "have had reasonable investment-backed expectations that their oyster leases
would give them rights protected from the planned freshwater diversion projects."89

Liberal use of the background principles exception of Lucashas also provided an
opportunity to apply another variation of the notice defense. The exception originated in the
Court's statement that a restriction so severe as to eliminate all economically beneficial use
"cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation) but must inhere in the title itself;
in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already

place upon land ownership."g0 Notwithstanding this rather clear language, several courts have

''1100 F.3d 933 (Fed Cir. 1997).
"Id at 936.
"Idat 934-935.
"Id at 937 (emphasisadded).
Id.

n

A

declined to confine the reach of the exception to restrictions deriving ,f?omproperty and nuisance
law, instead extending the exception to recently enacted statutes and regulations.
A good example is Citv of Vixinia Beach v. B ~ u . ~
In' that case, the Virginia Supreme

Court rejected an argument that background principles are limited to restrictions that were
"previously permissible under relevant property and nuisance principles.""
emphasis in

The court saw the

on the existing law of property and nuisance as a mere product of the facts

considered by the Court. S i the regulation in

was enacted after the claimants

purchased the property, "the only way the State of South Carolina could have argued that the
restriction was not a taking would have been to show that, at the time of the owners' purchase,

fundamend nuisance and property law had always prevented them f?om developing their
property and that the statutoly restriction was simply making explicit relevant property and
nuisance law."93 Because the ordinance involved in

predated the plaintiffs acquisition, the

court did not see a need to so limit the background principles concept, and held that the
restriction qualiiied as a claimdefeating background principle even though it did not have a
basis in hdamental nuisance or property law.94

92

498 S.E.2d414 (Va 1998).
Id at 417.418.

"Z

.&i at 418. Other courts have simikrly concluded that statutes may pmvide limitations defeating --based
claims. See Humkrv. State. 519 N.W.2d 367, 370-371 (Iowa 1994) (6nding that the plain- taok title
subject to statutory restrictions, and refusingto interpret the background principle exception of Lucasto apply the
94

state common law of property); Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council 461 S.E.2d 388,391 (S.C. 1995)
(concluding, based on Lucas.that the plaintiffs takings claim was defeated since he " n e w had the right to fill
critical area tidelands" due to the existof a statute in effect at the time of pwhase). However, a few courts
have limited the background principle concept to limitations inherent in state property or nuisance law.
Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States. 208 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (in order for a "law or decree"
to be a background principle under &it must "do no more than duplicate the d t that could have been
,p..
achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the Srate under its
complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally").

a

...

In Kim v. Citv of New ~ o r k , ~the
' New York Court of Appeals adopted the same view,

and expanded the background principles exception. Relying on Lucas.the court declared that
"the threshold step in a takings inquiry is to determine whether, in light of the 'existing rules or
understand'i' of State law,plaid@ ever possessed the property interest they now claim has

been taken by the challenged governmental action."% It subsequently indicated that the takings
analysis would always begin with this initial inquii wen if cases involving an alleged physical
taking." The wurt later rejected an argument that the "'logically antecedent inquiry' into the
owner's title should be limited to those property and nuisance rules recognized at common law.
and that the statutory law should not &or into the analysis."98 According to the court, "[ilt
would be an illogical and incomplete inquiry if the courts were to look exclusively to wmmonlaw principles to identify the preexisting rules of State property law, while ignoring statutory law
in force when the owner acquired title.n99Such an application "would represent a departure from
the established understanding that statutory law may trump an inconsistent principle of the
common law."'00 Sice the plainfiffs "never owned the property interest they claim[ed] was
taken37101the court found that just wmpensation was not required.

In contrast to these cases, a few courts have explicitly declined to apply notice as an
insurmountable barrier to a takings claim. For example, in Store Safe Redlands Associates v,
United

the Court of Federal Claims criticized a rule that would prevent property

owners h m bringing successrl takings claims whenever the regulations involved predated the
purchase of the property, because "[ulnder such logic, Congress could pass a law that stated that
% 681
% Id.

N.E.2d 3 12 (N.Y.1997).
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (emphasis in original).

at 314,
at 314-315.

"Id.
=Said at 315.
99 id.
'06id.
lo' Idat318.
lrn % Fd. CI. 726 (19%).
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no one could build on their property," and "[alfter all property had passed hands once, the right
to build on one's property would be lost to everyone."1m Referring to the Nollan footnote, the
court asserted that "defendant's argument that plaintiff cannot predicate.a taking on regulatory
action predating its purchase of the property is not a logical conclusion based on precedent."1M
Notwithstanding this rather strong language, the court recognized that notice could potentially be
relevant in noting that a "notice defensen had been recognized in a prior decision of the court.10S
The Supreme Court of Connecticut also rejected the notion that a takings claim is
categorically barred ifthe regulations involved preceded the claimant's acquisition. In
wand Wetlands and Watercourses kenq,lo6 the plaintiff purchased the property subject to
wetlands regdatibn at a price lower than the value the land would have had ifdevel~~able.'~'
The court found the plaintiff capable of having reasonable expectations even though the
restricting regulations were in place at the time of purchase. In fact, the court concluded that the
trial court could have legitimately found that "even so substantial a discount fiom market vahuz.
reflected nothing more than a prudent evaluation of the foreseeable difficulties of resolving the
tension between the property's listing on a residential subdivision map and the wetlands
constraints with which it was burdened."'08
Implicit in Store Safe and

is the idea that notice may be a relevant consideration but

should not be conclusory. This perspective can also be seen in some partial takings cases which,

....

'"Id Thccourtfoundtheaotice~'~"slatingthatthatan~softhe&ectafthegovemmnt

a

=&on
on the water rights would not be appropriate until after the scope of the rights was determined.
It
ultimately decided to have.an evidenthuy hearing to determine the plaintiffs property rightsbefore allthe
plaintiff to assert its takings claim. at 737.
06 593 k 2 d 1368 (Corn.1991).
'07 Id. at 1372. The plaintiff purchased the property for S50,000. There was testimony at the trial that time months
laterthe property would have had a value of 680,000 if "buildable." Id.
108
Id The court did not, however, conclusively rule on the plaintiffs eqxctatiom or takings claim, holding that
the
was not yet ripe for review.
at 1374.

a

,-.

though appearing to articulate strong rules of notice, at least apply all three Penn Central factors.
Such an approach was used in McNultv v. Town of in dial anti^.'^^ In that case, the federal district
court asserted that one "who purchases land with notice of statutory impedimentsto the right to
develop that land can justify few, if any, reasonable investment-backed expectations of
development rights which rise to the level of constitutionally protected property

right^.""^ The

court found that the plaintiffwas "on notice that the property was subject to restrictiom," and
advanced that "the burdens imposed on an individual in a regulated environment are often simply
the cost of 'living and doing business in the civilized comm~mty.'"'~' Nonetheless, the court
also considered the character of the government action and the economic impact of the regulation

and did not ground its decision that there was not a cornpensable takings solely on notice."'
Other courts have exhibited a less stringent view of notice by co*g

the background

principles of Lucas to existing property and nuisance law and by viewing such background
principles as the only defense to a total takings claim. Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United

States'"

provides a good example. In that case, the Federal Circuit identified the possible

background principle defense as the only relevant issue when a regulation deprives the owner of

all economically viable use.'"

The court subsequently d e s c n i the background principles

exception as limited to restrictions of common law nuisance. It explained that "the common law
of nuisance makes unlawhl certain conduct of property owners," and characterized
Iw
"O

"I

as

727 F.Supp. 604 (M.D. F h 1989).
IcJ, at 61 1, auotinp.Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Board, 485 A.2d 287,291 (1984).
McNultv, 727 F.Supp. at 612,
J., dissenting).
Pennsylvania Cod, 260 U.S. at 422 (Bran-

"'See McNultr, 727 F.Supp at 608414.

208 F.3d 1374., 1383
(Fed
- - ~
\ - -- .Cir 2000).
Id. at 1379. m e court accepted the &ngs framework outlined in Loveladies Harbor.Inc.v. United State.$, 28
~ . 3 d171
r (Fed. Ci.1994). That characterization appears to confuse the tests of Pem Central and
in
describing a three part analysis involving a determination of whether there was a denial of economically viable use,
an interference with distinct investment4mcked exoeaations and whether the interest involved was "vested in the
owner, as a matter of state pmpeay law, and not within the power of the state to regulate under common law
nuisance doctrine." See Palm Beach Isles. 208 F.3d at 1379. However, the wurt apparently viewed this test as
applicable only in partial takings cam, since it clearly viewed the background principle exaption as the only
defense to a categorid takings claim. &&
"3

~~~
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allowing a state to "convert these implicit background principles into explicit laws without
thereby effecting a

However, "[wlhen a regulation that fohids all economically

beneficial uses of the land goes beyond these background principles.. .the government must pay
compensation."116
In sum, prior to Palazzolo. notice of existing regulations was treated in widely divergent

ways. Many courts applied the so-called notice defense using varied applications of the Perm

Central and

tests, while others rejected notice as a complete bar to recovery ofjust

compensation. The decisions of the Supreme Court have facilitated this lack of consistency.
The Court's r&sal to articulate many clear standards has certainly contributed to the problem.
In addition, the apparently opposite views adopted by the Court in Monsanto and the &Alan

footnote, with little attempt to distinguish the two made the Court's statements regard'ig notice
difficult to use, allowing for further confusion in state and lower federal courts.
Decision of the Rbode Island Supreme Court

The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Palazzolo v. state"' reflects some of the
confusion found in the state and lower federal court decisions, and is a clear application of the
notice defense. The court held that the case was not ripe for review, but considered the merits of
the claim as an alternative ground for its decisi~n."~
Referring to the "undisputed evidence" that
Palazzolo could develop the upland portion of the property, yielding a value of $200,000, the
court concluded that he had not been deprived of all economically beneficial use.119It

nonetheless asserted that, "even if Palazzolo had been denied all beneficial use of his property,

'I5

Palm Beach Isles. 208 F.3d at 1383.

116 rr

1u.

,-

"'746 A.2d 707 (RI. 2000).
M

at 714.

"'Id.- at 715.

he would not be able to demonstrate a

taking."120 Since Palazzolo did not become the

owner of the property until 1978, when the regulations at issue already existed, the court found
that the background principles exception applied, concluding that "the right to fill the wetlands

was not part of Palazzolo's estate to begin with."'21 In so holding, the court explicitly rejected
Palazzolo's argument thrt, "if a regulation deprives an owner of all beneficial use, it is

i m m a t d whether the regulation predates the claimant's ownership in the land."122According
to the court, such an approach would conflict with Lucas's command to evaluate whether the
Furthermore, accepting
particular use was part of the title acquired by the claima~t.'~
Palaaolo's argument "could lead to pernicious 'takings claims' based on speculative purchases
in which an individual intentionally purchases land, the use of which is severely limited by
environmental restrictions, and then seeks compensation from the state for that 'taking. m124
Having found no total taking, the court considered the Penn Central test. Again refto the fact that the regulations were in effect at the time Palaaolo acquired title, the court stated
that, "in light of these regulations, Palazzolo could not reasonably have expected that he could
fill the property and develop a seventy-four-lot s~bdivision."'~~
Finding the lack of reasonable
investment-backed expectations "dispositive" of the partial takings claim, the court did not
consider the other two Penn Central factors.126

Irn

Id

lo v. State, 746 k 2 d 707,716 (2000).
IZ4 Id.
123 r~
1-

IUIdat717.
Iz6 Id
- ThC decision to find notice determimtive was apparently an extension of the state's e x k h g precedent. In
Alaeriav. K
.
687 k 2 d 1249,1253 @I. 1997), the court declared that "prior kuowledge of applicable
regulations is relevant in determining whether a claimant's investment-backedexpectations were reasonable" under
the P ~ M
Central analysis. Despite Uus a d o n , the court considered all Lhree of the Pem Central factors.
at 1253-1254.

A

The Supreme Court Opinion

The Supreme court1" began by outlining the general framework of takingsanalysis,
declaring that the it had given "some, but not too specific, guidance to courts confronted with
deciding whether a particular action goes too far and effects a regulatory taking."lZ8The Court
identified the general rule of

as one of those guidelines, stating that, "with certain

qualifications.. .a regulation which 'denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land'
will require compensation under the Takings c la use."'^^ When a total taking cannot be

d l i s h e d , "a taking may nonetheless have occurred, depending on a complex [set] of factors
including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation
interferes with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action."lM
After providing the background, the Court concluded that the case was ripe for judicial
review,131and then considered the merits of the takings claim. It c h a r a c t d the decision of
the Rhode Island Supreme Court as amounting to, "a single, sweeping rule," that "[a] purchaser
or a successive title holder.. .is deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction and is
barred fiom claiming that it effects a taking."13' The Court opined that this rule was based on the
notion that the state creates property rights and can therefore "shape and define property rights
and reasonable investment-backed expectations."'"

In response to the presumed state court

theory, the Court, though r e c o m n g that the right to develop property is subject to the
"reasonable exercise of state authority," asserted that, "[tlhe State may not put so potent a

delivered the opinion ofthe court,inwhich ReIqukt, O'Comr, Scalia and Thomasjoincd Stmns
FineKeaaedy
d
only in the portion of the opinion dealing with ripeness.
F'abzzolov. Rhde Island, 533 U.S.606,617 (2001).
'"Id., cruo~~Lueas,
505 U.S.at 1015.
I30 r~

I".

,-.

13'

a
at 618426.

Id. at 626.
' U ~ & m l ov. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.606,626 (2001).

j3'

Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle."'% Unreasonable regulations "do not become less so
through passage of time or title."'35 In the Court's view, considering post-limitation transfer of
title to be entirely determinative, would allow government to, "in effect, put an expiration on the
Such a bar would hurt i b r e owners as well as owners at the time of

Takings

enactment who may be unable to ripen or otherwise pursue their Takings Claim before
surrenderingtitle.'"

Expressing aversion for a rule that would allow the state to avoid paying

compensation by mere coincidence of transfer of title, the Court declared that "[tlhe State may
not by this means secure a windfhll for
The Court found

to be "controlhg precedentn for its conclusion, observing

that the dissent's noticefocused theory was rejected in that case.'"
that

In addresing an assertion

"stands for the proposition that any new regulation, once enacted, becomes a

background principle of property law which cannot be challenged by those who acquire title after
the em~hmnt,"'~'the Court declared that it had had "no occasion to consider the precise
kumstances when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle of state

law."'42 The Court instead found it sufficient to merely recognize that "a regulation that
otherwise would be unconstiMional absent compensation is not transformed into a background
principle of the State's law by mere virtue of passage of title."'"

1u.

Id The aMt asserted that the owners would be "shipped of the ability lo transfer the interest which was
possessed prior to the regulation." It tbcn cited Ellicskon, Prmenv in Land,102 YmL.1. 1315, 1368-1369
'31

(1993), for the proposition that the,"rightto transfer land is a defining c h a r a c t d c in the fee simple estate."
"* Palazzolo, 533 U.S.at 628. The Court declared that such a rule was "capricious in effect," and remarked lbat a,
"blanket nrle that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim beoomes ripe is too blunt an
inshument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken." 16
483 U.S.825 (1987)
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,533 U.S.606,629 (2001).

'"
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The discussion of categorical takings and notice ultimately became dicta. L i e the Rhode

,-.

Island Supreme Court, the Court concluded that the unquestioned abiity of Palazzolo to build a
"substantial residence" on the upland portion of the property precluded him from establishmg
use.'"
deprivation of all ec~nomicall~beneficia

The Court subsequently observed that the

claims were not evaluated under Penn Central, and remanded the case for application of the
three-factor test, stating only that a partial takings claim "is not barred by the mere fact that title

was acquired after the effective date of the stat&mposed re~triction.'"~'
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion, in which she agreed that the "Rhode Island
Supreme Court erred in effectively adopting the sweeping rule that the preacquisition enactment
of the use restriction ioso facm defeats any takings claim based on that use restricti~n."'~
However, she wanted to clarifythat the "holding does not mean that the thing ofthe
regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn Central
analysis."'47 She asserted that "it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration £tom
the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive s i ~ ~ a n c e . "According
'~~
to
O'Connor, the Penn Central test always mandates a consideration of investment-backed
expectations, and "the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at
issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations."'49 She emphasii that, in
contrast to the Rhode Island Supreme Court's view that expectations are "dispositive,"
expectations are but "one factor that points toward the answer to the question whether the

'"

14.at 631-632. In so holding, the C m refUsed to consider Palamlo's newly presented argument that the
upland portim and thc wetlands portions should be considered sepamtely. Since the argument was not made in thc
state courts and was not part of the petition for certiorari, the C o M chose to consider the property as a whole.
Id. at 630.
%azzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.606,632(2001) (O'Cmmor, J., mcuning).
14' Id. at 633.

'''

/-'

Id.

Id.
-

application of a particular regulation to particular property 'goes too far.'"lM Similarly, "the
state of regulatoryaffairs at the time of acquisition is not the only fixtor that may determine the
extent of investment backed e~pwtations."'~~
O'comor found this characterization to strike the
appropriate balance because, "C]f investment-backed exptations are given exclusive
significance in the Penn Central analysis and existing regulations dictate the reasonableness of
those expecmiom in every instance, then the State wields far too much power to redefine
property rights upon passage of title."lS2 But, "if existing regulations do nothing to inform the
analysis, then some property owners may reap windfalls and an important indicium of k e s s is
lost."1s3
Justice Scalia wrote separately on the post-regulation acquisition issue to clarify that he
did not agree with Justice O'Connor. He &st addressed O'Comor's ' b v i n W argument,
generally downplaying the potential problems arising when a buyer purchases property at a price
reflecting the restrictions and subsequently acquires compensation pursuant to the Takings

~1ause.l" Even so, Scalia conceded that, "[tlhere is something to be said (though.. .not much)
for pursuing abstract ' k e s s ' by requiring part or all of the windfall to be returned to the
original owner."'

However, Were is nothing to be said for giving it instead to the

gsvemment."156 Scalia criticized O'Comor's opinion, asserting that she "would eliminate the
windfall by giving the maletkctor the benetit of its malefaction."1s7 He ultimately concluded that
"the fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title (other than a restriction
forming part of the 'background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance') should
Isa
151

Id at 634 (emphasis in texl).
Id

Is2

&zm10

lS3

Id

IY
Is'

v. Rhode k h d , 533 U.S.606,635 (2001) (O'Connor, J., c

Idat 636 (Scalia, I., concurring).

iiat 636.
I" Idat 636437.
'"Id
-at 637.

o

~
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have no bearing on the determination of whether the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a
because "[tlhe 'investment-backed expectations that the law will take into account do
not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so much of its
value to be unconstituti~aal."'~~
Perhaps going further than the majority, he asserted that, "a
Penn Central taking, no less than a total taking, is not absolved by the transfer of title."160.

Justice Stevens dissented flom judgment, and particularly from the Court's opinion on
post-regulation acq~isition.'~~
According to Stevens, ag"

is a discrete event," that "occurs

at a particular time, that time being the moment when the relevant property interest is alienated
from its owner."'62 Since Palaaolo acquired the property after implementation of the limiting
regulations, Stevens wnchded that he had no standing to bring the action, seeing Palazzolo as
"simply the wrong party to be bringing the a~tion."'~
Stevens found his understanding to be consistent with &!Q based on his view that,
"standing to assert a claim is determined by the impact of the event that is alleged to have
amounted to a taking rather than the sort of notice the purchaser may or may not have received
when the property was &erred."'64

Although the Nollans had notice of the possible

limitation when they purchased the property, the decision of the state agency to compel them to
surrender an easement was the event that brought the Takings Clause into effect.16' According to
Stevens, since the Nollans were the owners at the time of the "triggering eyent," they could bring

158

Palauolo v. Rhode Island, 533, U.S. 606,636,637 (2001) (Scalia,J., wncuning).

159 TA
160

I'

P

Idat 638 (Steven, J., dissenting).
Idat 638639. In a footnote, Stevens criticizes the majority for viewing a r@atory

taking different than a
"direct state appropriation,"observing that "the entire rationale for allowing compensationfor regulations in the first
place is the somewhat dubious proposition that regulations go so 'far' as to become the functiional equivalent of a
direct taking."Id. at 639, n. 2.
Is3 1d. at 641.
IM
%lazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533, U.S. 606,636,643 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Iss Id.

'61

a takings claim. In contrast, Stevens asserted that the "triggering event" in Palazzolo could not
be considered to have occwred when the Council denied Palazzolo's application in 1986,

because, "[tlhe title Palazzolo took by operation of law in 1978 was limited by the regukions
then in place."'66 Noting that he read the complaint and the Court's opinion on the issue of
ripeness as indicating that the regulations themselves effected the alleged taking,16' Stevens
concluded that Palaaolo "acquired no more than a right to a discretionary detennhation by the
Council as to whether to pennit him to fill the wetlands.3,168
Stevens apparently saw his interpretation as necessary to prevent a slide down a slippery
slope. He asserted that, "[ilf the existence of valid land-use regulations does not limit the title
that the 6rst postenactment purchaser of the property inherits, then there is no reason why such
regulations should limit the rights of the second, the third, or the thirtieth
O'Connor's concurrence, Stevens indicated that in cases analogous to N

C i
A he would treat

notice of the regulation "as relevant to the evaluation of whether the regulation goes 'too far,' but
not necessarily dispo~itive."'~
Justice Ginsberg also wrote a dissenting opinion. She concluded that the case was not
ripe for review, but indicated in a footnote that "[ilf Palazzolo's claims were ripe and the merits

'66

Id at 643.

117.
at 644. Steveas attempted to distinguish the situations in which the decision ofthe regulatory body, rather
thaTthe enactment of the regulation itself should be considered as the event triggering the Takings Clause. He
concluded that, "[ilf the -011
by the regulators to reject the project involves snch an unforeseeable
interpretation or extension of the regulation as to amount to a change in the law, then it is appropriate to consider the
decision of that body, rather than the adoption of tlie regulation, as the discrete event that deprived the owner of a
preexisting interest in property."
at 644,n7. He also noted that if Palaaolo's claim could appropriatelybe based
on later decisiom by the Council (as in Nollan), he would not find it ripe for judicial d e w . Id.at 644.
I" I d at 645.
"O b z z 0 1 0 v. Rhode Island, 533, U.S. 606,636,643 (2001) (Stevens, I., disenting).

lmzat6l4' ,
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properly presented," she would "at minimum" agree with O'Connor, Stevens and Breyer that,
"transfer of title can imp& a takings claim"'71
Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Ginsberg that Palazzolo's claims were not ripe for
adjudication, and joined in her opinion.ln Breyer additionally mentioned that he, "would agree
with Justice O'Connor that the simple fact that a piece of property has changed hands.. .does not

bar a takings claim," noting that he did not think the post-regulation

always

acquisition should determine the case.In According to Breyer, the Penn Central analysis "much
depends upon whether, or how, the timing and circumstances of a change of ownership a f t k t
whatever reasonable investment-backed expectations might othervise exist."'"

Since,

''ordhwily, such expectations will d i i in force and significance rapidly and dramatically-

as property continues to change hands over time.. .such factors can adequately be taken account
within the Penn Central hework.""'
Breyer would apparently also not find notice or transfer of title to be entirely controlling

in the total takings context. Amici argued that permitting "complete regulatory takings claims to
survive changes in land ownership could allow property owners to manufacture such claims by
strategically transferring property until only a nonusable portion

remain^.""^ Breyer responded

by noting that he could "not see how a constitutional provision concerned with 'fairness and
justice' could reward any such strategic behavior."'"

111

Id at 654, n.3 (Gbbmg I., dissenting).
drssermng).

Idat 654 (Breyer,J.,
'13 Idat 654655.
In

r'

id. at 655.

z
. -la
11.

'16

~alazzolov.Rhode Island,533, U.S.606,636,655 (2001) (Breyer, I., dissenting).

"'Id (quotingPeonCentral for the basis in fairaessandjustice).

Analysii
Perhaps most helphlly, the Court clarified the general h e w o r k of takings analysis.
The Court clearly viewed

and Penn Central as creating two entirely distinct inquiries. A

regulation that denies all economically beneficial use will require compensation except in
situations involving a limitation inhering in the title itselfthat can be characterized as a
background principle of state property or nuisance law.'"

The three-part Penn Central test only

applies "[wlhere a regulation places limitation on land that fall short of eliminating all
economically bendcial use."'79 Though not directly relevant to notice issues, this clari6cation
should prevent state and lower federal courts From importing the reasonable investment-backed
expectations factor into categorical takings analysis, either as an additional consideration or as a
substitute for "background principles." At least this should reduce the likelihood that a court will
find notice of a regulation to be determinative in the context of a m g takingsclaim, although

as discussed below, background principles may still provide an opening for application of a
notice defense in categorical takings cases.
What the Court speci6caUy said regarding notice and post-regulation acquisition is far
less clear. The majority appears to have held that newly enacted regulations can generally not be
characterized as "background principles" under the Lucastotal taking analysis.'w But,the
opinion obviously leaves open the possibility that there exist circumstances in which statutes
may become background principles. The Court's statement that "a regulation that otherwise
would be am&utional is not transformed into a background principle of the State's law by mere
virtue of the passage of titlen'*' implies that statutes or regulations that do not simply mirror

-

property or nuisance law may, at some point, become background principles. The assertion also
clearly allows for an interpretation that passage of title is at least relevant to the determination of
whether a statute becomes a background principle. Thus, transfer of title in and of itself will not
convert a statute into a background principle capable of defeating a kcas-based claim, but the
Court has left room for continued recognition of a notice defense in the categorical takings
context.
The concuning opinions do not fill in the gaps the majority left regarding ~ etakings
r
claims. O'Connor did not specifically address the effect of transfer of title in the context of
categorical takings. In characterizing the majority's opinion as restoring the balance to the Perm
inquiry, she did, however, advance that "[tlhe temptation to adopt what amount to
rules in either direction must be resisted."'"

Stretched to the most liberal interpretation, this

statement could indicate a disagreement with the

fkamework itse& although the statement

was made with reference to Perm Central. Nonetheless, her aversion to ~ ed ers should, at
minimum, suggest that she would not want notice or transfer of title to conclusively defeat a total
takings claim, or to be entirely irrelevant to such a claim.
Scalia's opinion is about as vague as the majority's on the categorical takings issue. He
concluded that, "the fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title (other than a
restriction forming part of the 'background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance') should have no bearing upon the determination of whether the restriction is so
substantial as to constitute a taking."'83 Whether he was refemng to background principles as
defined by the majority (i.e. passage of title is not alone sufficient but statutes or regulations not
grounded in nuisance or property law may eventually become background principles) or to the
,n,

'" Palazzolov. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,636 (2001)(O'Connor, J. concurring).
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&at 637 (Scalia, J.,

concurring).

original detkition fiom Lucas 0.e. only existing property or nuisance principles may defeat a
total takings claim) is unclear. Smce Scalia did not want notice to factor in to the Penn Central
analysis, perhaps the most appropriate way to read his opinion is as preserving the background
principles exception of lucas.but othenvise tinding limitations in effect at the time of
acquisition to be immaterial.'"
None of the dissenters discussed notice as it relates to categorical takings in detail.
Stevens' comment that he "would treat the owners' notice as relevant to the evaluation of
appears sufficiently broad
whether a regulation goes 'too far' but not necessarily di~~ositive"'~~
to apply in both the partial and total takings context. The same could be said about Ginsberg's

statement that "transfer of title can impair a takings claim."186Breyer was the only dissenter to
speak to the issue directly, but only mentioned that he thought the Takings Clause would not
permit takings claim to be created through strategic transfer of property.'" Despite the briefiness
of Breyer's discussion, his response to the arguments regarding manufactured claims seems to
assume that total takings could "survive changes in land ownership."'88 Given that his brief
dissenting opinion advocated focusimg on the chmmtances of each case.,lE9it may be reasonable
to conclude that he would not Support a rule that would make notice irrelevant in the categorical
takings context.
The absence of 4guidance r w i g when and how passage of title is relevant in the

pa P taking context sets the stage for inconsistent lower court determinations. The majority did
not set any definitive rules, instead expressing only generalized concern that a

rule of

'"

Interpnting Scalia'sw m c e as simply reaffirming
may be approPriatein Light ofthc fis* that Scalia
wrote that opinion See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Palauolo, 533 U.S. at 643, n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id at 654. n.3 (Gimbmg, J., dissenting).
I"
Palaaalo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,655 (2001) (Bwyer, J., dissenting).
I"

5
z
Id.
..

Seeat 654455 ("1 would agree with Justice O'Connor that the simple fact that a piece of property has

lm

changed hands...docs wt always automaticallybar a takings claim").

notice would give government too much power to interfere with property rights.'g0 The
vagueness of the concurring opinions on the categorical takings issue will not eliminate the
difficulty in applying the majority's opinion. Furthermore, the failure of the dissenting opinions
to clearly address this point does not allow for a useful contrast. Thus, lower courts are
apparently fiee to accord notice whatever significance they choose in the categorical takings
context as long as they stay within the non-restrictive outer bounds of the majority opinion.
Some courts may generally find only statutes that mirror the common law of nuisance or
property to constitute background principles, while others will actively consider notice and
passage of title when evaluating whether a particular statute qualifies as a background principle.
The impact of this decision on analysis of preexisting regulations in the partial takings
context is also perplexing. Although the majority remanded for application of the Penn Central
test, it did not provide any guidance as to the impact of notice on that inquiry. The court stated
only that the claim would not be barred "by the mere fact that the title was acquired after the
effective date of the state-imposed restri~tion."'~'As in the discussion of --based

claims, the

use of the term "mere" suggests that post-regulation acquisition will be a pertinent but nondispositive factor. Presumably, passage of title following implementation of limiting regulations
should be considered when analyzing the reasonable investment-backed expectations prong.
However, O'Connor apparently did not find this assumption sufficiently comprehensible, given
her decision to write a clarifying concumng opinion indicating that post-regulation acquisition is

an important, but nondeterminative factor in the Penn Central balancing test.'Scalia krther complicated the issue by explicitly stating that the "investment-backed
expectations that the law will take into account do not include the assumed validity of a
lso

19'

See Id at 626628.
ld630.

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606,632636 (O'Connor, J., concurring)

restriction that in fact deprives property of so much of its value to as to be uncon~titutional."'~~
Although he concurred in the majority opinion and purported to disagree only with O ' ~ o n n o r , ' ~ ~
Scalia's view appears to be at odds with that of the majority. As discussed above, the majority
opinion, though catainly not unambiguous, seems to assume that the fact that property is
acquired after the effective date of the disputed regulations will factor in to the Penn Central
analysis. Scalia apparently would not consider post-re-gulation acquis'ltion to form any part of
the expectations analysis under Penn Central.
Despite the uncertainty, the majority and concurring opinions at least appear to
definitively decide that notice should not be a complete bar to a partial takings claim. Regardless
of whether this fact is not considered at all, or is factored in to the Penn Central balancing test,
lower courts should not be able to use this decision in such a way as to justify finding notice of
regulations or the preexistence of regulations entirely determinative. By implication, the opinion
confirms that the expectations prong itself should not be elevated to decisive status.lg5
The dissenting opinions provide some indication of what a future Supreme Court case
addressing notice in the partial takings context might look lie. Stevens mentioned that in cases
which he would find analogous to Nollan-in

which the regulations were in place at the time the

owner acquired the property but the so-called triggering event occurred at a later time-he

would

agree with O'Connor, treating notice of the regulation as relevant but not necessarily

determinative.'% Breyer also concluded that transfer of title could be part of the Penn Central
analysis.'" S i y , Ginsberg stated that she would "at minimum" agree with O'Connor,
193

at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id at 636.
'%
specifically made this point
at 634 (O'Connor, I., concurring) (expeaatiollsare but "one
factor that points toward the answer to the question whether the application
of a particular regulation to particular
..
p m p q 'goes too far'").
% Id. at 613, n.6 (Stevens, J., concumhg).
191 Id
-at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Stevens and Breyer that "transfer of title can impair a takings claim."'98 It thus appears that, to
the extent that Scalia's opinion is meant to advocate the irrelevance of transfer of title to the
Penn Central analysis, he has clearly lost.
Perhaps the specific approval of O'Connor's opinion by the dissenters and its apparent
consistency with the majority's unspoken views will prompt lower courts to use the concurrence

as guidance.'99 The a b i i to rely on O'Comor's concurrence may ameliorate the cohsion in
the Penn Central analysis that will likely occur with regard to kcas-based claims. Her opinion
could insure that lower courts actually weigh the ad hoc Penn Central factors, instead of applying
notice as an absolute bar or completely ignoring the time of acquisition. This could potentially
better effectuate the goals of the Takings Clause. Although the government could not "put an
expiration date on the Takings

lau use,"^ those who were hlly aware that they would not be

able to develop property, and who paid a discounted price for it, will likely not benefit Erom
compensation. Perhaps the existence of "notice" or of a discounted price will then become

factual issues to be decided by the jury as opposed to presumptions automatically defeating a
takings claim.20' Such an approach appears to be consistent with Justice Breyer's statement that
the Penn Central analysis "much depends upon whether, or how, the timing and circumstances of
Id. at 654, a 3 (Ginskg J..dissenting).
lower courts have already relied on O'Connor's concurrence. SeeRith Energv v. United States. 247
F.3d 1355 (Fed.Cir. 2001) (citing O'Connor's c o n m c e for the proposition that Palazzolo did not hold that postregulation purchase was imlevant and that the failure to consider it would be as much of an error as to elevate it to
dispositive significance); Drnmonwealth Edison Co. v. United State& 271 F.3d 1327, 1350 n. 22 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(stating that O'Connor opinion indicates that "the regulatory environment at the time of acquisition of the property
remains both relevant and important in judging reasonable expectations").
See PatazzOlo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,627 (2001).
G.RBdford and J. David Breemer characterize the existence of a discounted market as a question of fact and
ooint oul that "Iclommentators have low understood that the existence of investmemt4mcked excectatiom and their
~kasonableness~
&e factual issues that.. . k t be determined bv a fact-finder weiszhin~evidenceat trial." Great
Exactations: Will Palawlo v. Rhode Island Clarih, the Murkv Doctrine of 1nv-&cot-~acked Exucctations in
R e d a t o o TakingsLag!. 9 N.Y.U. E m . L.J.449. 527-528 (2001). At least one murt has looked favorably upon
looking to tl~eacl& cir&tances
of the case before apply a notice defense. & Bowles v. United States, 3 1 FA.
C1. 37 (Fed. CI. 1994) (asserting that a notice defense makes sense in circumstances of "actual knowledge of the
government regulation prior lo purchase," because "[a] rational buyer who has actual notice of government land-use
regulations prior to purchase will mnsider the risk that use may be restricted when deciding how much to pay').
'9
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a change of ownership affect whatever reasonable investment-backed expectations might
otherwise exist."m
Despite the ability to manufacture some clarity through combination of the differaa
opinions, this case seems to have caused nearly as much confusion as it has eliminated. The only
clear rules appear to be that notice of limiting regulations should never be a complete bar to a
categorical or partial takings claim and that the government is not allowed to avoid providing

just compensation for otherwise unconstitutional action by the mere happenstance of passage of
title. In the absence of more defmitive rules regarding the impact of notice or transfer of title,
lower courts are left to treat them in essentially any way desired, so long as they do not rise to
the level of a complete bar, and perhaps, in partial takings cases, so long as notice is at least
considered.
At first glance, the rejection of notice as an absolute obstruction and the discussion of the

need to avoid absolute state control over property rights indicate a victory for private interests.

But,in practice, courts that have tended to 6nd notice determinative in the past will likely still
hold against most takings claims involving notice or transfer of title. Furthermore, those that
have not found notice relevant are now instructed to consider it, potentially reducing the number
of successll takings claims.
The lack of clarity in the Supreme Court opinion may be a product of a struggle with the
issue of how to balance h e s s and the possibility of allowing impermissibly expansive state
power. None of the justices, except Scalia, appeared to like the idea of allowing a landowner
who acquired property with a&

knowledge of existing regulations to bring a s u ~ l l

takings claim. However, the Court grappled with the problem of excessive governmental power.
It simply does not seem fair for the state to circumvent the requirements of the constitution
Palmzolo, 533 U.S.at 655 (Breycr, I., diaenting).

simply because the property changes hands. Although it is easy to imagine scenarios in which a
new purchaser will reap a substantial windfall, perhaps the more likely circumstance is a transfer
involving no consideration of a possible takings claim, or even of the limitations on the property.
It is ddXcult to see any relation between transfer of title in and of itself and the state's obligation
to pay compensation. Even if the prior owner is duped into selling the property at a low price,
allowing the subsequent owner to obtain a potentially unfair benefit by acquiringjust
compensation, as Scalia noted, it is difficult to justify allowing the government to avoid
payment. Ifthe government cannot take property without providing compensation, why should
it matter who actually receives that compensation? The Court, though speaking strongly about
excessive state power, appears to have balanced the problem in favor of the state. It made no
attempt to create a rule making transfer of title a bar to recovery only in circumstances in which a
windfall would actually occur. Nor did it attempt to fashion a rule that would allow the prior
owner to share the proceeds of the later-brought lawsuit. Under the Court's formulation, the
government may at some undefined point, put an expiration date on the Takings Clause.
And then there are the problems created by the unique facts of this case. Since Palazzolo
did not actually purchase the land, but instead acquired it upon dissolution of a corporation,2m
the Supreme Court could easily limit its decision to similar facts in a later case. It is at least
arguably significant that Palazzolo did not pay a reduced price for the land based on the
regulations in effect at the time, and that he was, in a practical sense,the owner of the land when
the regulations were promulgated. Although Palazzolo was not technically the owner of the land

until the corporation dissolved, his expectations were probably formed much earlier. It may
accordingly make sense that the effect of the regulations should not have an impact on this case.
The only Justice to clearly address this fact was Stevens who noted that his rule would apply when the "trader
of ownership is the &t of an arm's-length negotiation, an inheritance, or the dissolution of a bankrupt debtor."
'03
IA

The Court apparently did not 6nd these to be factom to be particularly noteworthy and did not
limit its holding with regard to them. In fact, it remanded for the Penn Central analysis without
speculating as to the Wrely success of failure of Palazzolo's claim. Despite the Court's decision
not to place emphasis on the facts of this case, the unique posture of this case may make it
particularly worthy of distinguishment in the lower courts. Perhaps, in situations of mutual
exchange (such as a traditional sale of the property), transfer of title will consistently be found to
completely bar a takings claim. This could make the possible victory for private property rights
appear even more hollow.

Following Palazzolo, a few courts have already utilized a more watered-down version of
the notice defense, e m p h a s i i that the case does not make notice or transfer of title irrelevant.
For example, in Sanderson v. Town of ~ a n d i ain, ~addressiig a motion for reconsideration, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's assertion that it had rejected the takings
claim based solely on notice, stating that it had "considered that factor significant, but not
dispo~itive."~~
Similarly, in Daniel v. Countv of Santa ~ a r b a r a , 'the
~ N i h Circuit noted that
the Supreme Court in Palazzol~"rejected the state court's 'blanket rule' that would have found
no taking whenever a purchaser was aware of the existing land-use regulations that reduced the
market value of property," but "did not adopt the converse of that rule."ZM It criticized a tenet

that would not require a consideration of notice or transfer of title, describ'ig such a rule as
permitting new purchasers to bring a takings claim, "even ifthere had been a taking for which

the prior owner had already been compensated, if the prior owner had already litigated and lost a
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2002 WL 66806 (9th Cir. 2002).
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takings challenge to that restriction; or ifthe prior owner had allowed application limitations
periods to lapse without creating a ripe takings claim or challenging an already-ripe claim.n208

Yet,other courts appear to have read Palazzolo as essentially entirely rejecting the notice
s .Supreme
~ ~ ~ Court
defense. For example, in State ex rel. Shemo v. Citv of Mavlield ~ e i ~ h tthe
of Ohio quoted extensively fromol-'

to support its conclusion that a limitation in

existence prior to the plaintiffs' acquisition would not preclude the finding of a taking.211 The
wurt asserted that, "the Supreme Court recently rejected a similar argument that a purchaser or a
successive title holder is deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted land restriction and is
barred from claiming that it effects a taking."212 A Florida wurt similarly construed Palazzolo in

Rukab v. Citv of Jacksonville ~eack'" stating that, "the United States Supreme Court
determined that purchasers of property subject to state regulation were not precluded from
raising a claim of a regulatory taking even ifthey were aware of the regulation at the time they
purchased the property."214
Perhaps the existence of varied decisions following Palazzol~indicates that the decision
will not amount to a victory for either public or private interests. However, the result will
probably not be one of balance, but instead of more confusion. While the opinion has certainly
cleared up some issues regarding notice (and will hopefully put the LucasIPenn Central
comminghg to rest), it appears that the Supreme Court will have to address problems of notice
again, if consistency in state and lower federal courts is to be achieved.
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at 352.
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Id. at 733. Tbe court then applied this rule in a direct (as opposed to inverse) condemnation action
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